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Researchon intergenerational transmission of wealth haspointed touncertainty--about
the date of one's own death, for example -- as a potential source of significant bequest flows. In
thispaper I examine the effects of this same uncertainty on the behavior of those who expect to
receivebequests. Potential heirs who areprudent will consume less than would be warranted by
the size of their expected bequests, and so on average consumption will rise at the age when
actual bequests are received,
I examine the effect of this uncertainty on the outcome of population aging. Population
aging, by changing the relative sizes of the bequeathing generation and those receiving bequests,
raises the average size of bequests received and reduces the saving of the bequest-receiving
generation. I show that accounting for the effects of uncertainty slows down the reduction in






and NBERThe large wealth of the elderly, and the prospect for its
transfer to a younger generation, is a subject that has attracteda
large amount of attention from both economists and the popular
press.'This interest has been spurred by two factors: the
increased wealth of the elderly, and changes in the ratio of the
number of elderly to their children that have been part of
population aging. For example, the ratio of the average net
worth of households with heads aged 66-75 to the average net
worth of households with heads aged 36-45 rose from 1.55 in
1962 to 2.10 in 1983.2 Similarly, the lifetime fertility rate fell
from 3.14 for women born 1886-90 (those who would be leaving
bequests in the 1960's) to 2.29 for those born 1906-10 (those
leaving bequests in the 1980's).3
Economists differ in their views on the importance of
intergenerational flows in general, and bequests in particular, for
"Baby-boomers will hit an $8 trillion inheritance jackpot,
a staggering transfer of wealth that will change the nation." U.S.
News and World Report (1990).
2Author's calculations based on the 1962 and 1983 Surveys
of consumer fiaance. Net worth includes housing equity.
Ryder, 1986. Following the 1906-10 cohort, lifetime
fertility increases gradually, reaching a peak of 3.20 for the
1931-35 cohort, and then falls dramatically to an estimated 1.92
for the 195 1-55 cohort.
1the levels of saving and capital accumulation. Kotlikoff and
Summers (1981) calculate that at least 80% of the wealth of those
currently alive is the result of transfers (both bequests and inter
vivos transfers) from previous generations. Arguing against the
importance of bequests, Modigliani's (1988) rough estimate is
that they constitute an annual flow of approximately one percent
of wealth. But even this low estimate of the importance of
bequests leaves them a significantrole: assuming a
wealth/income ratio of three, the size of the bequest flow is
significant in comparison to the personal saving rate, which
hovers around five percent.
Such a large flow of wealth should have a large effect on
the behavior of those who receive it. Evaluating how changes in
the size of these flows --due,for example, to demographic
change or to fiscal policy --willaffect other aspects of the
economy requires proper modelling of the role of these transfers
in the decisions of their recipients. A number ofpapers have
considered how the size of these flows are affected by changes in
institutions or population age structure.4 In thispaper I examine
the effects of the uncertainty that surrounds bequest receipt.
Uncertainty has already been incorporated into the
literature on intergenerational wealth flows in severalways.
Barsky, Mankiw, and Zeldes (1986) and Feldstein (1988)
4For example Hubbard and Judd (1987)or Lee (1992).
2consider intergenerational transfers in world in which there is
uncertainty about future wage income, either one's own or one's
children.Similarly Davies (1981) and Hurd (1989),among
others, consider the role of lifespan uncertainty in generating
bequests. Uncertainty about possible medical expenses at the end
of life has also been cited as a motivation for the elderly to hold
onto substantial resources as they age, and thus as a source of
accidental bequests (Palumbo, 1991).
In this paper, I examine the importance of uncertainty on
the part of the recipients of the inheritances. Uncertainty about
receipt of inheritances is in large part the flip side of the
uncertainty that generates bequests. The same end-of-life and
medical expense uncertainties that can generate bequests will be
reflected in the expectations of those whomay receive an
inheritance.Indeed, one would expect that the uncertainty
surrounding bequest receipt (in the case of accidental bequests)
could only be larger than the uncertainty which generated the
bequest: in many cases, children may not really know how
wealthy their parents are or the exact nature of their parents'
wills.
Recent literature on consumption has stressed the role of
individual uncertainty as a factor affecting decision-making (See
Deaton, 1992, for a discussion). Individual uncertainty about
future wages, for example, is large in comparison to aggregate
3uncertainty about future wages. Similarly, individualuncertainty
about future bequest receiptsmay bç large in comparison to
uncertainty about the aggregate flow of bequests. The uncertain
nature of bequest flows, combined with their large size,means
that modelling consumption out ofexpected bequests as if there
were certainty about bequest receipt will tend to overstate the
effects of such expected bequests. Ifconsumers are risk averse,
then the expected utility of an uncertainbequest flow will be
lower than in the case of certainty.Similarly, if consumers are
"prudent" (Kimball, 1990), then the path of consumption in the
case of uncertainty will differ from what would be observed in
a world with certainty. Skinner (1988) shows that uncertainty
about future income flows effectively increases the discountrate
which is applied to their expected values. The fact thatpeople
"under consume" (from the perspective ofcertainty equivalence)
out of expected bequests also means thatconsumption will, on
average, rise rapidly as uncertainty about bequest receipt is
resolved. Thus the expected lifetimepath of consumption will
slope upward more steeply than would be the case under
certainty.
En this paper I examine the difference between the
certainty and uncertainty models for a widely studied application:
the effect of populationaging on saving. Population aging, by
changing the relative sizes of the bequeathing generation and
4those receiving bequests, has the potential to affect theaverage
size of bequests received, and the saving ofbequest-receiving
generation.In a world with certainty equivalence, these
anticipated changes in bequest flows would have immediate
effects on the consumption decisions of those whoexpect to
receive them. If uncertainty is important, by contrast, bequest
flows will have their impact on consumption --anda larger
impact than under certainty --onlyat the time that they are
received. Since the difference between when a person can form
expectations about receiving bequests and when the uncertainty
about their receipt is resolved can be a full generation, allowing
for uncertainty can dramatically change the timing of the effects
of changes in the bequest flow.
Uncertainty also matters in evaluating the effects of
changes in the annuitization of the elderly, as discussed in
Auerbach, Kotlikoff, and Weil (1992). Providing annuities to the
elderly reduces expected bequests --howthis affects consumption
and saving of the young depends on how much the young were
consuming out of these expected bequests. The immediate
impact of annuitization on saving will be larger (that is, more
negative) in a world where the uncertainty of bequests is taken
into account than in a world of certainty equivalence. In both
cases, the consumption of the elderly who receive annuities will
rise. In a world of certainty, saving of the young will rise to
5partially offset the loss of the bequests, while in a world with
uncertainty, the young would not initially be consuming out of
expected bequests, and so would not alter their consumption
much in response to a decline in expected bequests.5
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next
section I examine an overlapping generations model in which
bequests are generated by uncertainty about one's own date of
death, and in which this uncertainty is reflected in the
consumption decisions of potential inheritors.I show how
allowing for bequest-receipt uncertainty affects the lifetime path
of consumption in both partial and general equilibrium. In
Section 2, I extend the model to allow for a second uncertainty:
the possibility of large end-of-life medical expenditures. Section
3 uses the model to examine the effects of population agingon
saving and the level of wealth.I show that accounting for
uncertainty leads to a larger adjustment of the wealth/income
ratio in response to changes in populationage structure than
would otherwise be observed, and thus delays the effects of aging
on the saving rate. Section 4 discusses the generality of the
effects highlighted in this paper.
5Similarly, accounting for uncertainty in bequest receipt will
change the analysis of the welfare implications of introducing
annuities, as in Hubbard and Judd (1987). Uncertainty makes
expected bequests less valuable, and so reduces one welfare loss
from annuities that would eliminate accidentalbequests.
61. Modelling Uncertainty in BequestReceipt
1.1 Previous Work
Hubbard and Judd (1987) consider an OLG model in
which bequests are generated by end-of-lifeuncertainty in the
absence of annuities. In their model, however, the.uncertainty
that generates bequests is not passed on to the nextgeneration:
all the members of a cohort receive the same bequest, which is
equal to the average bequest left each year by their parents'
cohort. The fact that individuals' inheritance receipt is invariant
to their own family's mortality history means that all members of
a birth cohort are ex-ante identical. In the models of Abel (1985)
and Eckstein, Eichenbaum, and Peled (1987), bycontrast,
individuals receive as a bequest the actual wealth held by their
parent, rather than the average wealth of the previous generation.
But in these models, individuals receive bequests at birth (if they
receive them at all), and so face no uncertainty about bequest
receipt. Thus bequest-receipt affects the level, but not the shape,
of the lifetime consumption profile.Kotlikoff, Shoven, and
Spivak (1989) use a four-period model in which lifespan
uncertainty generates bequests to analyze the effects of different
intergenerational bargaining outcomes on the distribution of
wealth. Potential heirs face uncertainty about their inheritances
at the beginning life. The model I present below has a similar
structure, but extends the model to 60 periods, allowing for a
7much more realistic simulation of the lifetime paths of
uncertainty, bequest receipt, consumption, and wealth.
The analysis of the effects of demographic change in an
overlapping generations model with bequests that is presented in
this paper is similar to that of Auerbach, et. al. (1989). In that
paper, there is no lifespan uncertainty, and bequests are
generated directly by a "joy of giving" on the part of parents.
Children receive their bequests upon their parents' deaths, but
know with certainty the size of their inheritances from the
beginning of life. Below I show that allowing for uncertainty in
bequest receipt changes the timing of a demographic change's
effect on saving.
1.2 The Basic Model
This section describes the basic model that will be used in
the analysis. Individuals live for a maximum of 60years. For
the first 30 years of life there is no probability of dying. For the
next 30 years, there is some known hazard, p(i), of dying atage
i, conditional on having reached age i-i. Corresponding to the
set of hazards are a set of probabilities of being alive at eachage
1, P(i). Individuals who reachage 60 know with certainty that
they will die in the next period.
Families consist of a single parent and N children.
Children are exactly 30years younger than their parents; Thus
8there is no chance that an individual will die before hisparent.
There is no altruism or annuity market in themodel, and so all
bequests are accidental.6 There are two uncertainties that face
individuals in the model. First there isuncertainty about their
own date of death. As is standard inmany models, this
uncertainty leads individuals to leave accidental bequests with
some probability. The second uncertainty is on the part of
bequest recipients: they are uncertain as to when they will receive
a bequest, if at all, and how large it will be.
The model is structured so that these two uncertainties
face the individual sequentially: by the end of his thirtiethyear
of life, an individual has completely resolved his uncertainty
about bequest receipt, but has not yet resolvedany uncertainty
about his own date of death. As in Abel's (1985) model, the
weaJth that an individual inherits will be a function of not only
his parent's date of death, but also of the dates of death of all of
his ancestors. However, a sufficient statistic summarizing all of
a family's history is the wealth of an individual at the end of his
thirtieth year of life. This is all that a person's child needs to
know in order to form his expectation of bequest receipt.
Throughout this paper I take the interest rate and the path
6There is also no risk sharing between generations. Such an
outcome will hold in the model of Kotlikoff, Shoven, and Spivak
(1989) if parents cannot credibly threaten not to leave any wealth
left over at the end of their lives to their children.
9of wages as exogenous, and focus on how changes in uncertainty
affect the paths of consumption, saving, and bequests.
1.2.1 The Individual's Problem
The individual takes as exogenous (and known from the
beginning of life), a vector lr(i), corresponding to the probability
of receiving a bequest at age i given that a bequest has notyet
been received, and a second vector, b(i), corresponding to the
size of the bequest that will be received atage i, given that one
is received in that period.The individual is assumed to
maximize the expected value of a time separable, constant





where 5 is the pure rate of time discount and P1 is the probability
of being alive in period i.
The individual's wealth (measured at the beginning of
each period) evolves according to:
(2) w, =(1+r) *(w÷ — c11)+D1b,
where y is labor income in period i, andD1 is a dummy variable
taking the value of one if a bequest is received in period i.
Individuals are born with noassets, and are subject to the
constraint that they cannot die in debt.
10Given that an individual has already resolvedhis
uncertainty about receiving a bequest, it is easy to solve for the
lifetime paths of wealth and consumption. The firstorder
condition for the individual's optimizationproblem gives the





andso consumption at age i is just a function of age, wealth, and







Given certainty about bequest receipt, it is alsoeasy to calculate
an individuals wealth path, and the path of his conditional
bequest --thatis, the bequest that he will leave at each age i if
he dies at that age.
Solving for the individual's path of consumption when
facing uncertainty about the date and size of bequest receipt is
more complicated. However, because of the nature of the
uncertainty, solution is not nearly as complex as many other
problems involving consumption under uncertainty. Define chlb(i)
11as the consumption at age i of an individual who has not received
a bequest (because his parent is still alive), and cb(i)as
consumption of an individual who has just received a bequest in
period i. Similarly, define wth(i) as the wealth of an individual
who has not received a bequest, and a(i) as the wealth of an
individual who has just received a bequest in period i.7
The wealth of an individual who receives a bequest in
period 1+1 is simply:
(5) wA =(wr +— c75x(1+r)+
Thisindividual faces no future uncertainty except about his own
life span: his consumption is the simple function of wealth and
future wages derived above. Thus given wealth and consumption
in period 1, it is easy to calculate wealth and consumption in
period 1+1 for an individual who does receive a bequest.
It is trickier to calculate the path of consumption in the
case where a bequest has not yet been received, cth.Itake
advantage of the first order condition:
Given values of c and cb1+1, one can use this equation to
calculate the value of c'"11. Thus given an initial value of c°
7Note that c and &'referonly to individuals who receive
their bequests in period i itself. Thus ?÷isthe consumptioii in
period i+ 1 of a person who received a bequest in period 1+1,
and not the consumption in period + 1 of aperson who received
a bequest in period 1.
12u'(c1th) =E1[u'(c11)]
{
} = [(1 —ir1+1)u'(ct) + 7r1+,u(cjb+j]
[-l-
onecan use the first order condition to calculate the full path of
And given the paths of cth and wthup through any age 1, it
is easy to calculate the paths of wealth andconsumption from
date i+ 1 onward given that a bequest is received. The finalstep
in calculating the path clthisto find the correct value for c'. To
do this, I take advantage of the fact that cth31,thatis,
consumption at age 31 given that no bequest has been received,
can be calculated two different ways. First, since there is no
uncertainty about future bequests in this period, it can be
calculated from the level of wealth that the individual carries into
this period. Second, it can be calculated from the first order
condition relating the marginal utility, of consumption in adjacent
periods. Only if these two values of consumption in the thirty
first period match was the initial guess at c"1 correct. Finding
the correct value of c" is accomplished through a simple
bracketing procedure.8
8An alternativeway of describing the final step in the
solution procedure is as follows: Given an initial value of cnUl, one
can use equations (4) and (6) to calculate the lifetime path of
consumption for a person who never receives a bequest (noting
that after age 30, the value of ir is simply zero). This path of
consumption can then be checked against the lifetime budget
13Given an individual's bequest expectations,one can
calculate all of the possible consumption paths that the individual
may follow. Figure One illustrates some of the possible paths of
individual wealth and consumption, depending on the date of
bequest receipt. Wages are constant over the first 30 years of the
individual's life, and zero thereafter. Thewage is set so that the
present value of lifetime wages is equal to 100.Theinterest rate
is set at five percent, and there is no time discounting. The
coefficient of relative risk aversion is four.9 The conditional
mortality probabilities are those for women aged 65-95inthe
U.S. in 1980, from Faber (1982).The paths of bequest
probabilities and conditional bequest sizes are taken from the
steady state of the model in the case where there is no
uncertainty about bequest receipt, which is described more fully
below.
Figure One shows how consumption jumps inresponse to
the realization of bequest receipt. Those who inheritearly in life
receive the most, since theirparents have not run down their
assets. Consumption growth for individuals who havealready
constraint to see whetherweajth at the end of the lastpossible
period of life is zero. Only one initial value of ch1willsatisfy
this condition.
Note 13 below discusses the effects ofdeviating from this
baseline set ofparameters.
14received bequests is constant untilage 31, after which rising
mortality hazard reduces it and eventually leads to falling
consumption. The path of consumption during the first 30years
of life for those individuals who have not received abequest is
relatively flat and may even slope downward, despite the fact that
the interest rate is greater than the discount rate and there isno
possibility of death over this period. The reason for this
phenomenon is that people who do not receive bequests receive
a negative shock in each period to their expected bequests. Both
positive and negative shocks are smaller as individuals approach
age 30 and the amount of wealth that their parents have available
to bequeath to them falls. At the same time, however, not
receiving a bequest becomes more of a surprise as individuals age
and their parent's mortality hazard increases.
1.2.2 Partial Equilibrium Effects of Uncertainty
I begin by examining the paths of consumption and wealth
for individuals with given expected bequest paths. I compare the
case of certain bequest receipt with uncertainty, holding the size
of the bequest flow constant. This partial equilibrium case is
relevant if one wants to know how to evaluate a given level
expected bequest flow. In general equilibrium, of course, the
size of the expected bequest flow received by a given generation
will be dependent on the uncertainty faced by their parents. Thus
15in the next section 1 examine the general equilibriumpatterns of
wealth and consumption in the certainty and uncertainty cases.
I compare consumption paths with and without uncertainty
about bequest receipt, holding the expected path of bequests
constant. More concretely, I compare the average consumption
of a cohort of individuals each of whom faces a vector of
inheritance receipt probabilities r(i) and conditional inheritance
sizes, b(i), with the consumption path of a cohort in which each
individual receives his ex-ante expected inheritance at each
age.'° When bequest receipt is uncertain, the avenge path of
consumption is just the avenge across different realizations of
bequest receipt of the paths shown in Figure One.
The two consumption paths --labelled"no uncertainty"
and "partial equilibrium effect of uncertainty" are shown in
'°There are two differentways to model the case where there
is no uncertainty: first, one can give to each member of a birth
cohort in each year of his life his share of the total bequest left
in that year by his parent's cohort. This is equivalent to giving
each member of the cohort in eachyear his expected bequest
receipt for that year, and is the technique that I use here.
Second, one can simply imagine that each individual knows the
date of death (and thus the bequest) of his ownparent. In terms
of the cohort-average paths of consumption, saving, and wealth,
these two approaches give the same results, since the propensities
to consume out of a dollar of expected bequest (in the case of
certainty) are invariant to the size of the bequest. Of course the
two approaches have different implications for the within-cohort
distribution of wealth and consumption.
16Figure Two." Note that in both these cases there is still
uncertainty about the date of one's own death; the cases differ
only in whether there is uncertainty about bequest receipt. The
avenge level of consumption within the group that receives
uncertain bequests rises more rapidly thanconsumption for the
group with certain bequests, as individuals in the group get the
news that they have received an inheritance. Put anotherway,
uncertainty at the individual level depresses the initial level of
consumption for members of this group. Members of the group
that receives uncertain bequests also hold more wealth in oldage
as a result of their depressed initial consumption --andthus will
leave larger bequests. The next section discusses the general
equilibrium effects of this difference in estates left as a function
of expected inheritances received.
1.2.3 General Equilibrium Effects of Uncertainty
By the time an individual completes his thirtieth year, his
uncertainty regarding the age of death of his parent has been
resolved. As in standard models of accidental bequests, the
individual chooses consumption over the rest of his life, facing
only lifespan uncertainty. In choosing this path for consumption
"The bequest paths, b(i) and 'r(i), are those produced as
steady states in the case of certain bequest receipt examined
below.
17and wealth, the individual also determines a path of contingent
estates, B(i) =W(i).From the point of view of that individual's
children, these contingent estates are a stream of contingent
inheritance receipts. Given that children are exactly 30years
younger than their parents, and that each parent has N children,
the conditional inheritance receipt at age i for an individual in
family jisb1,=B1+30/N. Similarly, the probability of bequest
receipt in each period of the child's life conditional on not having
yet received a bequest is just given by his parent's mortality
hazard: ir1p130.
At birth, individuals in a cohort differ only in the path of
conditional bequests that they face. The wealth of an individual
at the end of his thirtieth year of life, and thus the conditional
bequest receipt path faced by that individual's children, is a
function of the conditional bequest receipt path faced by the
individual and of the actual date of death of the individual's
parent. Thus any individual's wealth is a function of the full
history of his family. The individual's wealth at the beginning
of his thirty-first year, W31, serves as a sufficient statistic to
summarize all of a family's history.Considering a large
population, there will be a steady state distribution of W3.12
12Tosolve for the steady state distributions of consumption
and wealth, I discretized therange of possible values of W31. I
then calculated a transition matrix betweenparent's value of W31
18The line in Figure 2 labelled "general equilibrium effect
of uncertainty" shows the average path of consumption in the
steady state. Because uncertainty about bequest receipt leads to
a shifting of consumption to later in life, bequests are larger
under uncertain bequest receipt than when bequests are certain.
Thus the general equilibrium effect of uncertainty about bequest
receipt is larger than the effect in partial equilibrium. The
increase in expected bequests has only a minor effect on
consumption early in life --onceagain, as a result of prudence -
- andso the average lifetime consumption profile is more steeply
sloped than in the partial equilibrium case. Average wealth per
and child's value of W31; each element in the matrix corresponds
to the probability that the child will have a given level of wealth
for the particular level of the parent's wealth. A single row of
the matrix is constructed by considering a single level of parental
wealth and calculating the child's wealth for all possible dates of
death of the parent. Taking this transition matrix to a high
power yields a matrix in which each row is the steady state
distribution of W31. Average life cycle paths of consumption and
wealth in the steady state are then calculated by combining the
distribution of W31 with all possible dates of death of the parent.
This approach to finding the properties of the stochastic steady
state turns out to be far more computationally efficient (and
precise) than the approach of actually drawing random dates of
death and then simulating over a large number of generations, as
is done in Kotlikoff, Shoven, and Spivak (1989).
19capita (assuming a constant population) is 22 % higher ingeneral
equilibrium when there is uncertainty about bequest receipt than
when there is no such uncertainty. Bycontrast, the partial
equilibrium effect of allowing for uncertainty about bequest
receipt is to raise wealth per capita by 12 %13
2.Adding Uncertainty about Medical Expenditures
In the basic model presented above, the onlyuncertainty
facing an elderly person (who has already resolved his bequest
receipt uncertainty) is about the date of his .death. Among the
undesirable properties of this model is that on the lastpossible
day of life, wealth of the elderly goes down to zero.'4 The
13Thevalues of the key parameters which produced this
result were r=5%,p=4, and3=0. Changing a single parameter
(holding the other two at their base case values) had the
following effects on the ratio of wealthper capita under
uncertainty to wealth per capita under certainty (which is 1.22 in
the base case):lowering pto2 lowers the ratio to 1.15;
lowering rto.03 lowers the ratio to 1.09; raising 6 to .03 lowers
the ratio to 1.17.
'41n the model,parents run down their wealth to zero at
death, and thus children face uncertainty about the size of
bequests received. But note that even ifparents keep the real
value of wealth constant untildeath, there is uncertainty for the
child about thepresent discounted value of bequest receipts. It
is only whenparents allow wealth to grow at the real interest rate
that there is nouncertainty about the present discounted value of
20slow speed with which theelderly do run down theirassets has
raised the question of whether sucha pattern would be observed
in a world where therewere a last possible day of life --thatis,
whether the elderly have motivations otherthan their own future
consumption for holding on to assets.
In this section, I extend the modelby having the elderly
carry wealth until death. There are several interpretationsthat
can be put on this wealth. First, itmay represent money saved
for end-of-life medicalexpenses. More generally, the household
may have some chance of entering a state in which themarginal
utility of a given level of consumption risesdramatically, and
may save for such an eventuality. Second, as has been well
documented, the elderly hold a large fraction of theirwealth in
the form of houses, which are often helduntil death (Venti and
Wise, 1990; Sheiner and Weil, 1992).15 Whetherthis housing
wealth is held out of a desire toconsume a specific bundle of
housing itself, out of a desire to provide for end of life medical
inheritances on the part of the children.
'5Price variability in real estate ispresumably less risky from
the point of view of anelderly person than from the point of
view of a potential heir. Homeowners are to a large extent
insulated from risk from theprice of their own home, since their
housing cost falls in the state of the world where theasset value
falls. But variation in theprice of a parent's home, whichmay
constitute most of an expectedbequest, is not similarly insured.
21expenses, or as an asset shielded from Medicaid's tax, is not
clear.
To be concrete, I focus on the possibility of end-of-life
medical expenditures as an additional source of uncertainty facing
the elderly. This modification affects the certainty of bequest
receipt in two ways: first, because of health uncertainty, the
elderly will carry higher assets, thus potentially leaving higher
bequests. Second, the lottery over end-of-life health adds more
uncertainty to bequest receipt.It also moves this uncertainty
later into the child's life, and thus reduces the number of years
over which shocks can be spread.
Uncertainty about medical expenditures is introduced into
the basic model as follows: I assume that individuals face a
constant probability, q, of facing extra consumption needs in the
last period of life. For simplicity I hold this level of these need
constant at ten years' worth of wages. Thus individuals who
have a possibility of dying will always have assets greater this
level. When individuals do die, their estate is equal to their total
wealth with probability (l-q), and to their total wealth less this
emergency fund with probability q.
The basic model presented above can be straightforwardly
extended to the case of end of life uncertainty modelled here.
Once again, consumption for an individual who has resolved his
uncertainty about receiving an inheritance, and who only faces
22uncertainty about his own date of death and his own end-of-life
expenditures, can be written as a function of wealth,age, and
future wages. The first order condition used to determinethe
path on consumption in the case where the parent has notyet
died is:
u'(c1')=[(1 —r1+1)u'(c1)+qr11u'(c11)÷(1 —q)ir+iu'(c177)J[1 :J
wherec1m is consumption in period / if the individual's parent
died and had end-of-life medical expenses cr is consumption in
period i if the individual's parent died and did not have such
expenses.
Figure Three shows some potential realizations of the path
of consumption in the model with uncertainty about end-of-life
expenditures. There are now two uncertainties facing a potential
heir: when his parent will die, and whether theparent will
consume his emergency fund. The probability that a parent will
face end-of-life expenditures (q) is set at ten percent. For heirs
whose parents die when they areSyoung, there is a positive shock
whether or not the parent has end-of-lifeexpenses. For heirs
whose parents die when they are old, on the other hand, having
a parent who faces large end-of-life expenditures constitutes a
negative shock, and consumption falls.
Figure Four shows the partial and general equilibrium
23effects of uncertainty about bequest receipt in this model.
Uncertainty about one's own end-of-life needs motivates people
to leave larger expected bequests in this model, and these larger
bequests drive a bigger wedge between th behavior of
consumption when bequest receipt is modelled as being certain
and its behavior when bequest receipt is uncertain. The partial
equilibrium effect is to raise consumption in the second half of
life (after uncertainty about bequest receipt has been resolved) 15
percent above the level with certainty, as opposed to 9 percent in
the basic model. In general equilibrium, consumption in the
second half of life is 27 percent above its level with certainty, as
opposed to 18 percent in the basic model.
3. The Effects of Population Aging
Over the next decades, the ratio of old people to working
age population will be growing dramatically. Although this
population aging is the product of decreases in both mortality and
fertility rates, it is the latter that is by far the dominant force.
(Keyfitz (1985), Weil (1993)). In changing the ratio of the
elderly to their children, population aging affects either the size
of bequests left, the size of bequests received, or both. In this
section 1 consider how the effects of population aging depend on
24the level of uncertainty surrounding bequestreceipt)6
3.1 Steady States
I begin by comparing steady state levels ofconsumption
and wealth (both aggregate andage profiles) for different levels
of population growth and for different treatments ofbequest
uncertainty.Figure Five considers the four cases: with or
without uncertainty about bequest receipt, and withor without
uncertainty about end-of-life medical expenditures. For each
case, the steady state profile of consumption is plotted for the
case where each individual has 1.5 children and the case where
each individual has one child (this is meant tocorrespond to a
movement from three children per couple to two childrenper
couple). The effect of having fewer children is to increase the
size of bequests. Raising the level of bequests in turn raises the
importance of uncertainty surrounding their arrival.
Increasing end-of-life uncertainty or bequest receipt
uncertainty increases the impact of changing the population
growth rate. Steady-state consumption at age 31 is 13% higher
due to a drop in population growth when neitheruncertainty is
present (panel A); 25% higher when uncertainty about bequest
'6The discussion here intentionallyignores the many other
factors, such as changes in the youth and old-age dependency
burdens, which will affect the saving rate as the populationages.
25receipt alone is present (panel B); 18% higher when uncertainty
about end of life expenses alone is present (panel C); and 37 %
higher when both uncertainties are present (panel D). In the
cases where bequest receipt is uncertain, reducing the rate of
population growth has only a small effect on initial levels of
average consumption, and so induces a rapid growth rate of
consumption over the course of life (as uncertainty is resolved).
By contrast, when there is no uncertainty about bequest receipt,
reducing the rate of population growth leads only to a parallel
shift upward in the lifetime consumption profile.
These same effects can be seen in changes in assets.
Reducing the rate of population growth raises the steady-state
level of wealth per capita rises by 25%when neither uncertainty
is present (panel A); by 40% when there is only uncertainty
about bequest receipt (panel B); by 28% when only uncertainty
about end-of-life expenditures is present (panel C); and by 49%
when both uncertainties are present (panel D). The fact that
wealth per capita rises by more in the case of uncertainty than in
the case of certainty means that, as will be shown below, there
is a force offsetting the negative effect of a slowdown in
population growth on saving.
3.2 Dynamic effects of aging
I now turn to the effects on the aggregate saving rate of
26population aging. My goal is to show howallowing for
uncertainty in bequest receipt alters a model's predictions for the
-responseof saving to demographic change.I consider the
following experiment: the economy is taken to be in asteady
state in which each parent has 1.5 children and in which each
birth cohort is 1.36% (= 1.5"°-1)larger than the one that
preceded it. Starting in year t, the number of births is taken to
remain constant. The decline in the birth rate is taken, inturn,
to be a product of some of parents in the cohort of 3 1-year-olds
having birth rate of 1 (one child per parent), while the rest have
a birth rate of 1.5. Over time, the fraction of 31-year-olds who
have only one child rises until, after 30years, all parents have a
birth rate of one. Thus following the demographictransition,
each birth cohort is made up of some fraction ofpeople who
have sibship'7 of 1, and some who have sibship of 1.5. After 30
years, all people born will have sibship of 1, but people within
a birth cohort will differ in the number of generations in their
family since the birth rate changed: For example, of the children
born 40 years after the demographic transition begins, 38 % will
be the second generation born with sibship of one (that is, their
parents will also have had sibship of one) and 62 % will be the
first generation born with sibship of one (that is, theirparents
'7A person's "sibship' is equal toone plus the number of his
siblings.
27will have sibship of 1.5).'
Figure Six shows the paths of the saving rate, relative to
its level in the initial steady state, for four cases considered
above: with or without uncertainty about bequest receipt, and
with or without uncertainty about end-of-life medical
expenditures. With or without medical expenditures, allowing
for uncertainty about bequest receipt delays the onset of lower
saving in response to a decline in population growth. This is
because, when bequest receipt is uncertain, individuals in the
cohorts that will be receiving larger bequests do not immediately
raise consumption in response to their larger expected bequests,
but rather wait until these bequests have been received. In the
forty fifth year of the demographic transition, the saving rate is
equal to 30% of its initial level when there is no uncertainty
about bequest receipt or end-of-life medical expenditures; 42%
of its initial level when there is uncertainty about bequest receipt
but not medical expenditures; 35 % of its initial level when there
is uncertainty about medical expenditures but not bequest receipt;
and 50% of its initial level when both uncertainties are present.
'8This somewhat complicated scheme is chosen to avoid the
"cycling" of age group sizes that would normally be observed if
the birthrate for all families jumped simultaneously, and at the
same time allow for feasible computations in which only two
possible levels of sibship are considered.
284. Extensions and Modifications
Although the model presented above takesan important
step in showing how uncertainty about bequestreceipt can be
incorporated into a life cycle simulation, it is stillvery stylized.
In this section I discuss some of theways in which the real world
differs from the model, and I examine how thesechanges would
affect the importance of the effects thatare present in the model.
A first point to be noted is the low level offinancial
wealth held by most households. Other thana house, pension
plans, and Social Security, most households in the U.S. have few
assets. Given the large annuity provided by SocialSecurity, this
may be optimal behavior for households with life cycle
preferences. Alternatively, it may be evidence thatsomething
like a buffer stock model of saving (Deaton,1991; Carroll, 1992)
is applicable to most households. To theextent that the degree
of saving in annuitized assets is not fully under thecontrol of the
household (which is certainly true for SocialSecurity),
households with low saving will be even lessprone to consume
out of expected bequests than the householdsfacing uncertainty
modelled above. Households will not be able toconsume out of
bequests until they are received because they haveno wealth to
run down, and because uncollateralized borrowing isfairly
limited.
29As second important consideration is the degree of
uncertainty surrounding bequest. It seems clear that, among the
very wealthy, although the timing of bequests is not know, the
size (or more accurately, the present discounted value) of bequest
receipts is not particularly uncertain. The very wealthy pass on
assets at death for tax or personal reasons, not because the
parents may need the money for their own consumption. Taken
together these two points --thelow level of life cycle saving of
most people, and unimportance of uncertainty for the wealthy --
meanthat uncertainty about bequest receipt is probably more
important for the median household, but less important for total
saving and wealth accumulation, than is implied by the model
presented here.
In terms of analyzing the effects of demographic change,
the model presented here has only addressed some important
phenomena. The model holds constant both the average age
difference between parents and children and theaverage age of
heirs at the time that their parent dies. While the former of these
is not a terrible assumption for the U.S., the latter is clearly
false. In the U.S., women's lifeexpectancy at the birth of the
last child rose from 40.4 for women born 1900-1909 to 47.5 for
women born 1940-49. This means that the average age of
resolution of the uncertainty surrounding receipt of inheritances
will have similarly risen, amplifying the effects analyzed here.
30Individuals who might fund their retirementswith inheritances
received from their parentsmay now have to wait until the time
of their own retirements to see whether suchinheritances are
forthcoming. Prudent children faced with such aprospect will
save for retirement on their own, and, onaverage, see their post-
retirement consumption rise dramatically.
Finally, a key question is how different uncertainties
interact. Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes(1992) focus on the
interaction of three sources of uncertainty that faceindividuals:
wages, health, and date of death. In this paper I have highlighted
a fourth uncertainty: the date and size of bequest receipt. Ifone
believes that bequests are important factor inwealth
accumulation, and that a significant fraction of bequestsare
accidental, then uncertainty about bequest receipt should be added
to the list of the "usual suspects."
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